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Longwood University
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ABSTRACT
What motivates a corporation to issue cash dividends? What specific financial factors lead
management to make a decision as to the creation or amendment of their firm's dividend policy?
What factors are common among firms issuing a dividend to their shareholders, and do these
factors share a commonality across sector boundaries and market capitalization? This study
attempts to identify the impact of certain financial variables on the dividend decision/policy oj a
corporation by analyzing the financial data of over 10,000 publicly traded firms found through
the Multexinvestor.com database using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression. The study
tests the effects offinancial variables (deemed appropriate by the finance literature) on dividend
policy (as measured by the firm's payout ratio) for a sample of firms screened from the
Multexinvestor.com database. By analyzing these selected financial factors on a large sample of
firms, this study will also identify those financial variables that have proven historically
significant in explaining the dividend decision. The study results add to the body of dividend
policy literature by either supporting or rejecting the theories advanced in the literature.

INTRODUCTION
The financial world has yet to develop a model indicative of the process by which corporations
create an effective dividend policy. In conjunction with t_his, there still remains controversy over
the value of dividends themselves to both the firm and the investor. Many studies are divided in
their findings, as some researchers have taken a "normative" approach to answering questions
concerning dividend decisions, while others have taken a "behavioral" approach, looking directly
to management for answers on the factors that enter into their decision-making process.

Simply

put, dividend policy is the determination of which portion of cash earnings should be retained in
the firm for reinvestment and which funds are paid out to investors from either current or

accumulated retained earnings, but the complexities of this payout have continued to mystify the
financial community.

LITERATURE REVIEW
WHY PAY DIVIDENDS?
Factors such as the impact of dividends on stockholder wealth, the role of dividends in stock
valuation, and the stockholders' expectations of future cash flows from dividends still provoke
controversy among finance scholars as to the value of issuing a dividend for both the investor
and the corporation. Robert Parks, author of The Witch Doctor of Wall Street (1996), refutes the
need to issue dividends by suggesting the following:
The maximum potential growth of earnings occurs, other things being equal, when (a) all
revenues covering depreciation are reinvested to replace depreciating capital and (b) all
earnings are invested, or plowed back, into new and expanded assets. In that extreme
case, assuming perfect markets and no change in perceived risk or required return, the
moneys plowed back into assets would show up dollar-for-dollar in a rise in the price of
the stock. Assuming also no tax differences, the investor could look upon dividend
receipts at the end of the year as being...an equivalent rise in the market price of the
stock by the end of the year. He could treat market appreciation the same as the receipt
of dividend income. (228-229)
The Modigliani-Miller (MM) Dividend Irrelevancy Theorem is the basis for the theory indicating
that investors are financially unaffected by a firm's decision to reinvest earnings or distribute
them as dividends to investors. The capital gains would be equivalent to dividends in a perfect
market without tax considerations or attached transaction costs. The MM Theory states that
shareholder wealth will remain unaffected by dividend policy in that without tax as a
consideration, investors place equal weight in receiving returns as dividends or capital gains as
long as the firm's investment policy is not affected by dividend policy (Shapiro 539).
Negative aspects associated with paying out profits to shareholders include the potential tax costs
associated with dividends, agency costs, and the lost opportunity to reinvest these corporate
earnings to further the firm's growth. William Droms (1990) also suggests that investors might

benefit more from reinvested earnings as can be seen in the residual dividend policy theory
(217). Furthermore, corporations often face limitations in the framing of their dividend policy
imposed by legal constraints, such as the capital impairment rule, stating that firms cannot issue
cash dividends from capital assets, and the insolvency rule, which forbids dividends be paid
during periods of insolvency (Weston 659). By paying a dividend, a firm also risks having to
use more expensive external financing methods if earnings are not sufficient enough to cover
both dividends and investment opportunities, which results in a higher opportunity cost for the
firm (Shapiro 549).
Why then do corporations offer dividends in light of their supposed irrelevance in a perfect
market and their negative characteristics? Although investors may be in theory mathematically
indifferent to dividend policy, dividends themselves have proven very relevant in the eyes of
investors for behavioral reasons (Shapiro 542). As most investors are risk-averse, a predictable
return through dividends is often preferred to the uncertain return of capital gains resulting from
reinvested earnings, despite the fact that either option would lead to the same end result in the
absence of taxes and expected transaction costs (Shapiro 541). Dividends also lend more easily
to "regret aversion" than capital gains in the eyes of investors as investors are more likely to
prefer spending income received via dividends rather than from sale-induced capital gains
(Shapiro 542). The imperfections of the market, including taxes and especially agency costs
resulting from management choices inconsistent with the goal of increasing shareholder wealth,
also cause dividend policy to become highly relevant in the case of stockholder wealth (Shapiro
541,549). In conjunction with agency costs, the free cash flow hypothesis states that a dividend
increase is a positive signal to investors as it reduces the amount of free cash flow available for
unauthorized use by management (Ross 519). Dickens (2002) also suggests, "The factors
explaining dividends should be important because the intrinsic model holds that a stock's price is
the present value of its future dividends."
Although a firm's success is driven by its financial fundamentals in the long run, the emotions of
the marketplace are very relevant. For example, the shift in behavioral attitudes towards
dividends is evident, particularly over the past decade. During the 1990s, dividends were not as
preferable as they have been since 2000 as the bull market was the optimal location to keep

funds. Since the bubble burst and the market outlook became bearish, investors have recalled the
importance of dividends in that they are paid out regardless of prevailing market conditions. In
the long run, dividends also may help encourage management to make choices that will benefit
the firm in a long-term sense without worrying about short-term fluctuations in stock price. If
dividends are provided as a steady stream to investors during times when short-term price
fluctuations are common but long-term gain is promised, investors are still guaranteed some
form of return, and management can act in the long-term interests of the firm.

DO DIVIDENDS SIGNAL FUTURE SUCCESS?
Positive factors further encouraging corporations to issue dividends include the psychological
perceptions of investors. The favorable behavioral reactions of stockholders to the positive
signal dividends convey as well as the economic rationale for a reliable dividend policy suggest
the underlying value of dividends. Although management's choice to either raise or lower a
current dividend may not greatly affect the current value of the firm, these changes can have a
marked effect on the market price of the stock and the opinions of both investors and company
stakeholders.
Dividends serve as an indicator of the firm's present and future performance and potential risk
level by lending credibility to management claims, and as such may help determine the market
price of the stock. As said by Cottle, Murray, and Blick, "For the majority of common stocks,
the dividend record and prospects have always been the most important part of controlling
investment quality and value" (Graham and Dodd's Security Analysis, 1988).

Stability in

dividend policy is often necessary to eliminate uncertainty and the potential poor market
valuation by investors associated with unpredictable dividend payments, and a decrease in
dividends often results in a negative market response as seen by a reduction in the price of the
stock. The level of the decline in stock price is, however, often dependent upon the reason
behind the dividend cut, be it poor earnings or future growth potential (Shapiro 537). Therefore,
dividend payout percentages are often raised only after a permanent increase in earnings is
expected with the firm, which results in a lag between earnings and payout ratios. The dividend
signaling hypothesis is in line with the smoothed residual dividend policy.

'Other economic rationale behind a stable dividend includes the idea that dividends limit both the
amount of expensive external financing that is needed by the firm and the associated floatation
costs and investor concerns which can result.

Stable dividend policy further limits the

transaction costs paid by the investor when a variable dividend may result in selling or buying of
shares to compensate for the deviation from needed current income (Shapiro 535). Shapiro also
suggests that high dividends provide benefit to investors as when firms must resort to external
financing methods, the unbiased opinion of the lender provides stockholders with a good
indication of the firm's standing and future potential (Shapiro 549).
In theory, management should work to maximize stockholder value, and dividends often work to
accomplish this goal provided that firms do not issue dividends to the point where they reject
investment projects with positive NPVs, thereby altering their investment policy. Dividends then
often have a significant benefit to the corporation. Droms (1990) states that normally a
corporation's prosperity and earnings growth lead to an increase in dividends, and thereby
increase the value of the stock and allow for capital gains (Droms 216).

THE CLIENTELE EFFECT AND RECENT TAX LAW CHANGES
A firm must consider other preferences of their investors when determining dividend policy
would investors prefer to receive a profit through capital gains or a payout of cash dividends
(Parks 230)? A 1974 study conducted by Black and Scholes cited a significant factor affecting
dividend policy to be the tax repercussions, known as "clientele influence." Tax rates relating to
the stockholders' tax brackets affect investor desires for dividends. Investors in higher tax
brackets have often preferred that earnings be retained in the firm to avoid paying heavy taxes,
while investors in lower brackets prefer to receive returns in the form of dividends (Weston 661,
Shapiro 546).

This effect seems to be changing, however, in light of the May 2003 tax law

changes that have altered the tax rate on dividends. As the maximum tax rate on dividends
through 2008 is now 15% and equivalent to the tax on capital gains, the appeal of dividends
should widen across tax brackets (Yang and Chang), though capital gains still have a slight
advantage in that they allow taxpayers to defer taxes until a later date.

According to Sivy, this

tax change has, however, already boosted the availability of dividend-paying stocks, as people
are no longer seeking tax benefits from capital gains; investors are able to receive " ...better

returns with greater predictability and lower risk" by investing in dividend paying stocks
(Dividends Rule!). Dividend reinvestment plans are also commonly available, allowing investors
to elect to use dividends to increase the number of shares owned, thereby plowing all income
into the creation of capital gains; the dividend payout can therefore appeal to investors desiring
either income or capital gains.

DIVIDEND THEORIES
The literature currently advances three main theories purporting to explain the methodology of
dividend policy, each of which centers on the idea of remitting residual earnings to investors:
•

Pure Residual Dividend Policy - states that when the corporation's return on equity
capital is greater then the rate of return the investor could obtain by reinvesting those
dividends in another investment of equivalent risk, the investor would rather the
corporation act on his behalf and reinvest the earnings rather than issue a dividend; the
firm can determine which option is better suited to benefiting the investor by first
identifying the firm's optimal capital budget, thereby noting the level of equity capital
required, and then maintaining the amount of earnings required to finance the equity
capital in the capital budget and allowing "residual" funds (earnings not utilized in
internal investment) after the mandated reinvestment to be issued as a dividend (Droms
218).

Therefore, dividends are a function of earnings fluctuations, and this method

allows for significant fluctuations in dividends with changes in earnings and corporate
investment opportunities. In effect, all residual earnings are paid out which causes the
dividend payout ratio to fluctuate. This policy also results in a dividend that varies from
year to year, and when equity investment is greater than earnings, equity financing must
be initiated to create a residual (Droms, 1990).
•

Smoothed Residual Dividend Policy - suggests that dividend fluctuations are kept to a
minimum. Dividend policy changes tend to lag behind earnings fluctuations according to
Shapiro, as "Dividends are set equal to the long-run residual between forecasted earnings
and investment requirements. Dividend changes, in tum, are made only when this long
run residual is expected to change; earnings fluctuations believed to be temporary are
ignored in setting dividend payments. The clear preference is for a stable, but increasing,
dividend per share" (Shapiro 532-533). As such, the dividend payout ratio fluctuates

significantly with this payment method, and dividends have the potential to exceed the
residual if earnings are unexpectedly low.
•

Constant Payout Residual Dividend Policy - suggests maintaining a constant dividend
payout ratio, which causes dividends to fluctuate with earnings.

•

Small Quarterly Dividend with Annual Bonus - suggests a small periodic dividend
and a yearly "bonus" dividend offered to investors if earnings exceed expectations.
Companies that experience wide earnings and investment fluctuations often use this
policy. This option benefits management, as they have cash flexibility, as well as the
investor as they are guaranteed a small yearly dividend.

DIVIDENDS STILL A PUZZLE
However little is known about the dividend decision-making process, these decisions do not
seem to be made lightly. All of the aforementioned factors (tax preferences, external financing
costs, signaling, agency and transaction costs), as well as inflation, liquidity position (indicating
ability to pay out dividends), stability of earnings, insider versus institutional control of the firm
(indicating differing preferences on holding earnings based on ownership situations), investment
opportunities (which tie up funds which could be paid out to investors), and the personal
preferences of management have been suggested to play a role in management's dividend
decision. It can be suggested, however, that dividends maintain a significant level of importance
as seen by the following quote from Investment News: "From 1926 through 2003, the dividend
component of the S&P 500 represented 42% of the index's total return" (www .davenportllc.com,
January 19, 2004).

PURPOSE
Although dividend policy remains a subject of controversy for many finance scholars, the belief
that dividends play a significant role has been further illustrated by the many empirical studies
and behavioral surveys that have been conducted on dividends. A deeper understanding as to the
motivation behind dividends would provide opportunity to better value stock, as most current
stock valuation models include dividends as a key element.

Although the aforementioned

literature suggests that dividends provide additional worth to a firm in the eyes of investors, it is
unclear what financial factors management uses to support their reasoning behind initiating a

dividend policy. This study investigates possible factors that could influence the dividend
decision for a large sample of dividend paying firms. The dividend payout ratio, being the
dependent variable, will be examined for correlation with the following factors selected from the
literature: return on equity, sales growth, beta, current ratio, debt to total assets, insider
ownership, institutional ownership, capital spending, and BPS growth.

RELATED STUDIES
Lintner's (1956) creation of a mathematical model indicative of dividend policy, which is today
continually reconfirmed by other research findings, was a key step in dividend policy research.
Lintner's study suggested that a main factor considered in adjusting dividend policy was the
change in the payout ratio in a direction away from the target payout. Baker, Veit, and Powell
(2001) determined that management places substantial importance on the choice of dividend
policy for their firm, and firms often review their policies annually. Baker and Powell (1999)
also noted that there were limited statistical differences between differing industries in regards to
managerial ideas on dividend effectiveness, thereby suggesting that dividend policy is a market
wide concern faced in similar fashions.
Baker, Veit, and Powell (2001) surveyed management of both financial and non-financial
NASDAQ firms to determine the influential factors on dividend policy. Of the twenty-two
factors evaluated, highly relevant factors in dividend policy decisions of both financial and non
financial firms included the past pattern of dividends, earnings stability, and current and
predicted future earnings levels, though significant differences exist between the degree of
importance that non-financial and financial firms' management place on several factors,
including legal constraints, capital structure maintenance, and the degree of financial leverage.
Baker, Veit, and Powell's (2001) results also suggested that managers' dividend decisions are in
tandem with the model created by Lintner.

Management's ideology on dividends seems to

include a belief that despite academic reasoning as provided by the Modigliani-Miller (MM)
Dividend Irrelevancy Theorem (1961), the dividend decision can impact firm value via a change
in stock price, thereby creating or reducing shareholder wealth; therefore this subject warrants
attention.

The importance of the pattern of dividends can be seen through Dickens, Casey, and Newman's
(2002) assessment that, as shown by bank dividend policy, the historical stability of dividend
payments can communicate substantial information about a firm. Dickens, Casey, and Newman
(2002) found that dividends convey value-related information about a firm that earnings and
other financial variables failed to communicate; one instance in which this is true is in the case
where earnings patterns are highly irregular while dividends are smooth, dividends can better
portray profitability potential than earnings.
Previous studies have indicated a positive correlation between expected returns and dividend
yield, though these numbers do not move in similar proportion, while other studies have
suggested no such correlation (Ross 476). One of the major suggested influences on dividend
policy is a corporation's desired growth rate. Shapiro states, " ...a rapidly growing firm, with an
abundance of positive net present value projects, will usually retain a larger share of its operating
cash flow than will a firm with few investment opportunities. As a result, rapidly growing firms
will have lower dividend payout rates" (550).
Aivazian, Booth, and Cleary (2003) have concluded that both return on equity and profitability
positively correlate with the size of the dividend payout ratio. Their study also concluded that
corporations with high debt ratios often had lower dividend payments, and firm size also
positively correlated with dividend payout. Moh'd, Perry, and Rimbey (1995) also concluded
that dividend payout related positively with firm size. Holder, Langrehr, and Hexter (1998)
suggest that corporations who placed their business focus on a single business line had lower
payout ratios than less focused firms.
Other suggested determinants of dividend policy have been the corporation's level of liquidity,
access to capital, cash flow, depreciation methods, current inflation level, and level of debt.
Myers and Bacon (forthcoming) determined that the higher the PE of a firm, the lower its risk
and the higher its payout ratio. Supporting management feelings regarding the issuance of
dividends include the desire to maintain access to equity capital to fund continued capital
expenditures and firm growth through flow of cash to stockholders.

Myers and Bacon

(forthcoming) find that dividend cash flow provides a positive signal to stockholders and

increases the reputation of the firm. Mick and Bacon (2003) found that past dividend patterns as
well as current and expected earnings levels are empirically relevant in explaining the dividend
decision, with future earnings being the most influential variable. Another key element in this
question is the level of stability associated with a corporation's projected earnings.

Droms

illustrates this by stating, "A high level of earnings stability reduces the corporation's business
risk and allows a higher dividend payout than could be paid if earnings were highly erratic"
(217).
Dempsey, Laber, and Rozeff (1993) determined that certain regularities exist between firms of
various industries, though these similarities seem to result from firm-specific factors rather than
industry-wide characteristics. Lintner (1953) offers that dividend policies have effects on the
industry beyond the obvious impact on investment acceptance and opportunity, internal funds
accessibility, and earnings stability. Lintner suggests a competitive motivation behind dividends
that goes beyond firm-specific factors.

As stated by Lintner, "Companies probably most

generally follow the 'lead' of other companies in the same industry, but on occasion may be
concerned with maintaining some sort of conformance to other companies whose securities are,
investment-wise, close substitutes for the company's own securities, even though the other
companies are in entirely different industries." This is later to be stated as the industry-related
dividend leadership hypothesis.
Baker and Powell's (1999) study indicates that 90 percent of management places substantial
value in dividends as they are believed to affect the firm's overall value, and they find that the
Modigliani-Miller proposition holds little weight in the real world. Signaling proved a key
motivation behind dividend policy, and their suggestion that dividends are a means to curb the
controversy resulting between the firm and its investors (as dividends help to monitor
management performance) was supported as dividends proved to reduce agency costs by forcing
the firm to seek external financing and thereby be subject to critical public evaluation. As stated
by Moh'd, Perry, and Rimbey (1995) in their study on the effects of dividends on agency costs,
"Distribution of resources in cash-dividend form compels managers to find outside capital,
thereby encouraging them to lower agency expenses as they are exposed to the capital market. In

this environment, the maximum level of dividend payout minimizes the agency cost structure as
compared to the cost of generating required funds."
Research indicates that the percentage of insider ownership versus institutional ownership also
affect dividend decisions. Dickens, Casey, and Newman (2002) examined the impact of
ownership on the banking industry and found that inside ownership correlated negatively with
payout ratio, thereby indicating that agency costs were less with largely insider-owned firms.
Moh'd, Perry, and Rimbey (1995) concluded that when the institutional ownership of a firm
increases, the dividend payout also increases.
Baker and Powell (1999) state that the use of dividend announcements as a way to evaluate stock
price has been determined applicable empirically, though other evidence suggests that dividends
announcements could potentially indicate growth as well as a lack of investment opportunities.
The tax preference explanation, although not supported confidently by empirical evidence, states
that stocks offering low dividends appeal more to investors in higher income brackets. Research
findings also indicated that market preference leans towards stable dividend growth rather than a
stable payout ratio.

SAMPLE SELECTION AND CHARACTERISTICS
To study the determinants of dividend policy, we tested the selected variables' effects on the
dividend decision for a large sample of publicly traded firms. We created the samples of firms
using the power-screening tool from Multex Investor. Multexlnvestor.com is the website of
Market Guide, Inc., which provides quarterly, fundamental financial information on over 10,000
publicly traded companies that trade on the NASDAQ, AMEX, NYSE, and OTC exchanges
(www.Multexlnvestor.com). We observed the data for all firms in the selected sample at the end
of the second quarter of 2004. The query of Multex Investor produced a sample of 542
companies. Firms were screened by each variable to generate the largest sample possible.

METHODOLOGY
To analyze those characteristics of a company that appear to affect the dividend decision, this
study employs Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression on the study sample. Independent
variables and hypotheses supported by the literature appear in Table 1.

TABLE 1. VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES
FACTOR

VARIABLES

DEFINITIONS

HYPOTHESIZED SIGN

DIVIDEND

DIVIDEND PAYOUT

DIVIDEND/EPS

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

DECISION

RATIO / 100

PROFITABILITY

RETURN ON EQUITY

NET INCOME/EQUITY

NEGATIVE- As profitability increase,
earnings are plowed into reinvestment
opportunities rather than into dividends
(higher ROE).

GROWTH

RISK

SALES GROWTH

BETA

5 Year compounded

NEGATIVE - Firms with high growth

annual growth rate of

opportunities should pay out smaller

Sales Per Share over last

dividends as earnings are reinvested to

5 years

fuel growth.

Slope of the 60 month

NEGATIVE-As risk increases, the

regression line of the

ability of the firm to distribute earnings

stock relative to the %

decreases.

price change of the S&P
500
LIQUIDITY

CURRENT RATIO

CURRENT ASSETS/

NEGATIVE-An increase in liquidity

CURRENT

indicates less paid out in dividends.

LIABILITIES
FINANCIAL

DEBT TO TOTAL

TOTAL DEBT I TOTAL

NEGATIVE-The more debt a firm

LEVERAGE

ASSETS

ASSETS

has, the less likely it will pay dividends,
as it has to contend with interest
payments.

CONTROL

INSIDER

% SHARES OWNED BY

NEGATIVE - Insider ownership should

OWNERSHIP

INSIDERS

indicate a preference to keep profits in
the firm (lower dividends).

INSTITUTIONAL

INSTITUTIONAL

% SHARE OWNED BY

POSITIVE - Dividends are a positive

INFLUENCE

OWNERSHIP

INSTITUTIONS

signal to outside investors, so firms
should act to attract outside investment.

EXPANSION

CAPITAL SPENDING

GROWTH IN CAPITAL

NEGATIVE-Expansion plans should

SPENDING

increase reinvestment of earnings within
the firm and decrease dividends.

PROFITABILITY

5 YEAR GROWTH IN

GROWTH

EPS

5 YEAR EPS GROWTH

POSITIVE - Higher EPS should
increase dividends paid, as there are
more earnings to draw from.

QUANTITATIVE TESTS AND RESULTS

The following table illustrates the regression results for the global sample of 542 firms.
TABLE 2: REGRESSION RESULTS
FACTOR

BETA

VARIABLES

HYPOTHESIZED SIGN

COEFFICIENT
DIVIDEND

DIVIDEND PAYOUT NA

DECISION

RATIO/ 100

PROFITABILITY

RETURN

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

ON -.0024

NEGATIVE

EQUITY
GROWTH

SALES GROWTH

-.0054

NEGATIVE

RISK

BETA

-.0011··

NEGATIVE

LIQUIDITY

CURRENT RATIO

-.0030...

NEGATIVE

FINANCIAL

DEBT

TOTAL +.0089...

NEGATIVE

LEVERAGE

ASSETS

CONTROL

INSIDER

TO

-.0227..

NEGATIVE

-.0044···

POSITIVE

-.0937

NEGATIVE

OWNERSHIP
INSTITUTIONAL

INSTITUTIONAL

INFLUENCE

OWNERSHIP

EXPANSION

CAPITAL SPENDING

PROFITABILITY

5 YEAR GROWTH IN +.0042...

GROWTH

BPS

R square

.383

F statistic

21.18···

N

542

POSITIVE

··S1gmficant at the 1% level
••

Significant at the 5% level

Significant at the 10% level

The multivariate regression analysis indicates that the following variables relate negatively to the
dividend payout ratio as hypothesized and are also significant at the 1 % level: profitability
(return on equity), growth (sales growth), risk (beta), liquidity (current ratio), control (insider
ownership), and expansion (growth in capital spending). Profitability growth (five-year growth

in EPS) related positively to dividend payout as hypothesized and was significant at the 1 %
level. Financial leverage (debt to total assets) produced an unanticipated, significant positive
relationship with the payout ratio, while institutional influence (institutional ownership) related
positively, not negatively as hypothesized, with dividend payout and was significant. Of the nine
independent variables tested, seven produced the anticipated relationship with the dividend
decision and were mostly significant at the 1 % level. Two of the nine variables produce contrary
signs with dividend payout and were significant. The F statistic shows that the multivariate
regression model produced significant explanatory power and the r2 indicates that the 38% of the
variability in the dividend payout ratio is explained by the independent variables tested.
As hypothesized by the literature (residual theory), sales growth and expansion related
negatively to the dividend payout ratio. Likewise, insider ownership produced the anticipated
negative relationship with dividend payout. Contrary to the literature, institutional ownership
varied negatively with dividend payout. The positive relationship observed between the debt to
total assets ratio and the dividend payout ratio produced anomalous results.
As expected, results suggest that the higher the firm's risk, the lower is its payout ratio. Since a
greater insider ownership results in a lower dividend, the findings suggest that possibly
management in the firms examined has an incentive to reduce dividends in order to increase the
expected value of their stock options received as executive compensation. The importance of
dividend cash flow as a signaling device to stockholders is also evident in the sample, since the
firm is willing to increase debt to fund increasing dividends. The firms in the sample behave as
anticipated by the literature since increasing dividends reduces liquidity, and the higher the
return on equity, the greater the firm's retained earnings for reinvestment or the lower is the
dividend payout. And finally, a higher EPS growth allows a greater capacity for the firm to
increase dividends. Overall, results support several of the dividend theories in the literature.
The Multex Investor query of firms was further divided into large cap, mid cap, small cap, and
micro cap samples. Table 3 indicates the division of the total sample by market cap, while Table
4 outlines the regression results by firm size.

TABLE 3: SAMPLE DIVISIONS
SAMPLE DIVISIONS

B = Billion
M = Million

#IN SAMPLE

GLOBAL

542

LARGE CAP (lOB to 200B)

131

MID CAP (2B to lOB)

184

SMALL CAP (300M to 2B)

192

MICRO CAP (SOM to 300M)

35

TABLE 4: REGRESSION RESULTS BY MARKET CAP DIVISIONS
Large
Cap
Betas

Mid Cap
Betas

Small Cap
Betas

Micro Cap
Betas

NIA

NIA

NIA

NIA

-.0024

-0.0013

-0.0001

-0.0059·

-0.0060

NEGATIVE

-.0054--

-0.0030

0.0106...

-0.0030

-0.0086

BETA

NEGATIVE

-.001(·

-0.0423

-0.0890.

-0.0428

-0.4780

CURRENT RATIO

NEGATIVE

-.0030

0.0606..

-0.0384

-0.0640

-0.0741

DEBT TO TOTAL

NEGATIVE

+.0089

0.8579

0.4223.

-0.0323

-0.9012

NEGATIVE

-.0227..

-0.0017

-0.0031·

-0.0028

0.0231•·

POSITIVE

-.0044

-0.0007

-0.0068 ...

-0.0048...

-0.00644

NEGATIVE

-.0937

0.0015

0.0038

-0.0019

0.0166

POSITIVE

+.0042-··

-0.0005

-0.0069

-0.0017..

-0.0109

R square

-----------------

.383

0.444

0.567

0.446

0.630

F Statistic

-----------------

21.78

6.13

14.70...

9.46••

2.16·

VARIABLES

Hypothesized
Sign

DIVIDEND PAYOUT
RATIO

DEPENDENT
VARIABLE

RETURN ON

NEGATIVE

Global
Betas

NIA

EQUITY
5YRSALES
GROWTH

ASSETS
INSIDER
OWNERSHIP
INSTITUTIONAL
OWNERSHIP
CAPITAL
SPENDING
5YR GROWTH IN
EPS

... S1gmficant at the 1% level
••

Significant at the 5% level
Significant at the 10% level

As shown in Table 4, the expected relationship between firm size and several variables surfaces.
Similarities between significance levels of individual variables between each sample are evident,
though a larger data sample containing information over multiple periods could have produced
more substantial and inherently more logical results. Notable information derived from the
segmentation of the sample is the significance and signs of the debt ratio coefficient. The data
suggests that debt is more likely to be increased to finance dividends in large and mid cap firms,
while smaller firms actually pay out less dividends as their debt increases, which is expected

based on the ability of the firm to cover its debt service. Well-established, large cap firms should
have less concern in covering their interest payments than more risky, small or micro cap firms.
A problem with multiple regression analysis arises when the potential for multicollinearity
among the selected independent variables exists. To check for the presence of multicollinearity,
Canavos (1984) suggests using large samples of firms and testing independent variables
interrelationships with a correlation matrix as shown in Table 5. According to Mason and Lind
(1996, p. 541), "A common rule of thumb is that correlations among independent variables from
negative .70 to positive .70 do not cause problems." As indicated in Table 5, none of the
selected independent variables for each of four regressions were shown to be highly correlated
since all were within the -0.70 to + 0.70 guidelines. Therefore, we control for the problem of
multicollinearity. Correlation matrices were also run to test for multicollinearity by market
capitalization. Results are shown in Tables 6-9. As seen in the sample correlation matrices,
multicollinearity does exist within the smaller samples, but the small sample sizes present a
threat to the reliability of these figures. By looking at data over multiple periods and over larger
sample sizes for each market cap segment, a better determination of the characteristics of the
data can be uncovered.

CONCLUSION
This study empirically examined the data for a sample of 542 firms taken from the Multex
Investor Database to assess the impact of selected financial variables on the dividend decision
using OLS Regression. The study used the firm's dividend payout ratio as the dependent
variable to represent the dividend decision. Independent variables tested include: return on
equity, sales growth, beta, current ratio, debt to total assets, percent of insider ownership, percent
of institutional ownership, expansion, and the estimated five-year growth rate for earnings per
share. Results indicated that in the global sample, all variables were significant in explaining
dividend policy decisions.
Although there will always be pros and cons to dividend policy, the analysis seems to indicate
that income via dividends is an attractive factor to investors both for the reasonable assurance of
return as well as the positive signal it provides regarding management claims. Dividend policies

are therefore worthy of management consideration, and the most common management thought
processes seem to include the ability to pay dividends in the long run based on cash flows and
revenue projections and the choice between utilizing excess funds for reinvestment or payouts.
There is therefore a trade-off between management decision as to the implementation and extent
of the payout in dividend policies versus reinvestment. This study can be continued by further
investigating dividend policy decisions based on market capitalization of firms. Data should also
be collected over several quarters to compare payout fluctuations over time and the levels of
relevance for each determinant over time. Further research should be conducted to determine the
relevance of dividend policies and their implementation strategies based on market sector.
Increasing the variables selected to include items such as float, PE ratio projections, operating
margins, debt to equity ratio, and others may also produce significant results.
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TABLE 5: CORRELATION MATRIX-GLOBAL SAMPLE
PO/100
5-yr EPS growth
CR
DITA
InsiderOwn %
Institutional %
5-yrSales G

Beta
5-yrCap Spend
ROE

PO/100
1.000
-.266
-.188
.258
-.050
-.325
.061
-.190
.105
-.142

5-vr EPS arowth

CR

DITA

InsI"der Own °o
%

Institutional %

5-yrSales G

1.000
-.043
-.127
.072
-.019
.392
-.043
.255
.142

1.000
-.489
.172
.109
-.041
.225
-.153
-.074

1.000
-.191
-.102
-.063
-.191
.103
.176

1.000
-.397
.131
-.015
.107
.030

1.000
-.210
.161
-.194
.024

1.000
-.071
.532
-.016

Beta 5-yr Cap Spend

1.000
.
-.101
.002

ROE

1.000
.031

1.000

Beta 5-yr Cap Spend

ROE

TABLE 6: CORRELATION MATRIX-MICRO CAP SAMPLE
PO/100
5-yr EPS growth
CR
DITA
Insider Own %
Institutional %
5-yrSales G

Beta
5-yr Cap Spend
ROE

PO/100
1.000
-.125
-.106
.118
.168
-.404
.004
-.261
-.194
-.140

5-yr EPS growth

CR

DITA

Insr'der 0 wn%

Institutional %

5-yrSales G

1.000
.324
-.182
.409
-.150
_704
·-.047
·J:85
.259

1.000
-.742
.298
.354
.294
.382
.157
-.072

1.000
-.227
-.344
-.027
-.393
-.012
.329

1.000
-.269
.262
.247
.173
.366

1.000
-.198
.242
-.019
-.209

1.000
.176
.704
.226

1.000
.083
.033

1.000
.175

1.000

Institutional % 5-yr S aes
l G

Beta

5-yr Cap Spend

ROE

TABLE 7: CORRELATION MATRIX-SMALL CAP SAMPLE
PO/100
5-yr EPS growth
CR
DITA
InsiderOwn %
Institutional %
5-yrSales G

Beta
5-yr Cap Spend
ROE

PO/100
1.000
-.305
-.241
.265
-.138
-.247
-.134
-.100
-.056
-.169

5-vr EPS growth

CR

DITA

InsiderOwn %

1.000
-.100
-.114
.005
.024
.362
-.070
.172
.186

1.000
-.448
.230
.098
-.125
.095
-.281
-.056

1.000
-.255
-.209
-.005
-.045
.171
.117

1.000
-.401
.084
-.035
.078
.094

1.000
-.155
.329
-.130
-.163

1.000
-.111
.429
.123

I

1.000
-.074
.029

1.000
.163

1.000

Beta 5-yr Cap Spend

ROE

TABLE 8: CORRELATION MATRIX- MID CAP SAMPLE
PO/100
5-yr EPS growth
CR
DITA
InsiderOwn %
Institutional %
5-yrSa/es G

Beta
5-yr Cap Spend
ROE

PO/100
1.000
-.227
-.267
.281
.038
-.508
.371
-.228
.357
-.178

5-yr EPS growth

CR

DITA

nsiderOwn %

Institutional %

aes G
5-yr Sl

1.000
.019
-.144
.117
-.024
.373
-.060
.267
.237

1.000
-.471
.091
.137
-.072
.292
-.099
-.009

1.000
-.165
-.096
-.007
-.188
.158
.062

1.000
-.442
.164
-.028
.146
-.009

1.000
-.299
.198
-.283
.144

1.000
-.218
.502
-.053

1.000
-.118
.025

1.000
.050

1.000

Beta 5-yr Cap Spend

ROE

TABLE 9: CORRELATION MATRIX-LARGE CAP SAMPLE
PO/100
5-yr EPS growth
CR

DITA
InsiderOwn %
Institutional %
5-yrSales G

Beta
5-yr Cap Spend
ROE

PO/100
1.000
-.368
-.136
.398
-.175
.004
-.218
-.152
-.060
-.108

5-yr EPS growth

CR

DITA

InsiderOwn %

Institutional %

5-yr Sa/es G

1.000
.078
-.231
.235
-.102
.575
-.076
.420
.078

1.000
-.474
.033
.030
.092
.515
-.085
-.030

1.000
-.055
.097
-.280
-.427
-.086
.270

1.000
-.457
.159
.075
.120
.097

1.000
-.171
-.095
-.163
.053

1.000
.071
_721
-.102

1.000
-.187
-.106

1.000
-.101

1.000

